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Michaels: A.I., Legal Change, and Separation of Powers

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LEGAL CHANGE, AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Andrew C. Michaels*

This article argues in favor of the proposition that Article III judges
should remain human, a proposition which turns out to be more
controversial than one might think. Some contemporary legal academic
literature has been arguing, to varying degrees, that replacing human
made law with artificial intelligence (“AI”) will or should happen. Most
directly, Eugene Volokh has recently posed an interesting thought
experiment asking this basic question: if AI advances to the point where
it can adequately mimic judicial opinion writing, should we accept an AI
judge? Professor Volokh argues that we should, but this essay
respectfully disagrees. Although AI technology is currently far from this
point, this essay engages with Professor Volokh’s thought experiment, in
the hopes that it could lead to some valuable insights into the importance
of humans in the legal system.
In Professor Volokh’s view, the resulting judicial opinion is all that
matters; he maintains that: “If a system reliably yields opinions that we
view as sound, we should accept it, without insisting on some
predetermined structure for how the opinions are produced.”1 This essay
takes issue with that basic premise. The judiciary is more than just an
opinion factory. There is significant value in the human involvement in
the process leading to the production of the opinion.
Perhaps the most common argument along these lines is that the
process fosters procedural fairness, which leads to deeper public
acceptance of the result and the legitimacy of the court system.2 But this
article seeks to draw attention instead to some related but different reasons
that the process itself has significant value, reasons that seem not to be as
thoroughly considered in this literature.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author thanks the editors of the
Cincinnati Law Review, as well as those who have provided helpful comments, including those who
participated in the 2019 South Eastern Association of Law Schools Annual Conference New Scholars
Workshop, the 2019 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at DePaul University College of Law, the
Fall 2019 IP Colloquium at BYU Law School, the 2020 AALS annual conference New Voices in IP
Scholarship panel, the winter 2020 JIPSA workshop at Saint Louis University School of Law, and the
2020 WIPIP conference at Santa Clara University School of Law. The author also particularly thanks
Emily Berman, Eric Goldman, James Nelson, Renee Knake, Sapna Kumar, Joseph Miller, Richard Re,
Rachel Sachs, Joseph Sanders, Pierre Schlag, Harry Surden, Alfred Yen, and Peter Yu for helpful
comments, as well as Rahul Rao for helpful research assistance. Finally, the author thanks Professor
Eugene Volokh for posing this interesting thought experiment.
1. Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1138 (2019).
2. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat The Law? The Rise of Hybrid SocialOrdering Systems, 119 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1, 2 (2019).
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Rather than focusing on the therapeutic and psychological value of the
right to be heard by another human, this essay instead focuses on the
epistemic losses and societal risks that could result from an AI judiciary
in terms of our ability to monitor, shape, understand, and think about the
law. In other words, rather than focusing on the citizen’s or litigant’s
right to be heard, this essay focuses instead on the law’s ability to “hear”
or be shaped by the human society that it rules.
By engaging in the process of arguing in front of a judge and
constructing legal arguments that potentially affect the outcome of the
potentially precedential case, the human legal community comes to
understand and play a role in shaping the law. This spreads power in the
sense that it gives judges, the legal community, and even to a lesser degree
the public as litigants, some hand in shaping the law. Human involvement
in the law also provides strong incentives for a substantial and wellinformed legal community to pay close attention to the law. Under a
system where humans collectively create the law, it is not some black box
authority to be blindly obeyed; it can be questioned and shaped through
reasoned argument. An AI judge, on the other hand, is much more of a
black box unpersuadable authority, even if it does mimic humans by
providing reasons in its judicial “opinion.”
Professor Volokh focuses on the AI judge’s ability to write a persuasive
opinion, but overlooks the importance of the ability of the judge to be
persuaded. A human judge can potentially be persuaded through reasoned
legal argument, whereas it is not clear that the same can be said of an AI
judge. It may be the relatively rare case that turns on the quality of
argument before the human judge, but the fact that such cases can and do
exist is important. Judicial persuadability contributes to the impression,
and the reality, that the legal community and the public may play a role
in shaping the law through argument, such that the law is a collective
societal creation. Even if it were possible to construct a persuadable AI,3
we would be faced with the vexing problem of having to decide upon
what factors the AI should be persuadable. Thus, this Article argues that
even if an AI judge could adequately mimic judicial opinion writing, there
are nevertheless significant practical reasons not to accept AI as a
replacement for human judges.
This Article proceeds with two main points. First, this Article
discusses the proper role of the judiciary in legal change, that is, in
shaping the law and adapting it to a constantly changing society.
Currently, courts do more than simply apply the law; they also make law,
though they do so in a more measured way than legislatures. They must
3. Cf. Emily Berman, Individualized Suspicion in the Age of Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 463,
502 (2020) (explaining that there are “factors relevant to legal decision-making that machines are simply
incapable of taking into account”).
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balance respect for precedent and stability against the need for law to
adapt to changing and unforeseen circumstances through adjudication.
Judges sometimes must choose between incommensurable values. The
differences of opinion that arise between judges or between litigants can
have epistemic value in that they help to flesh out and publicize debates
about what is the best law or policy. The human legal system creates a
beneficial updating dialogue between the law and the human society that
it governs, and there are significant benefits to having judges who are also
a part of that society.
Second, it is far from clear that an AI judiciary would be able to
effectively check the power of the other two branches. The argument for
artificially intelligent law is shortsighted and overlooks certain long-term
effects. Without human judges, we could lose much of the community of
professionals paying attention to the law. We will have replaced legal
thought with artificial legal thought. If we as a society don’t know how
to drive cars in the future, that may be fine, but if we forget how to think
about the law, this could be problematic. For one thing, it could hinder
our ability to adjust the law to changing societal circumstances. It would
also make society less aware of the law. The diffusion of knowledge of
the law throughout the human judiciary, legal community, and public,
may be important to separation of powers.
The argument here is primarily against replacing the actual decisionmaking of the Article III judicial branch with AI. This article is not
opposing AI as a tool to aid in research or as an AI staff attorney.4 Nor is
it opposing AI in the private sector, say, for medical purposes,5 or even
some private sector AI lawyers to the extent they are effective with human
judges. Nor is this article even arguing against the use of AI for some
decision-making in administrative agencies of the executive branch, or in
arbitration. Replacing the judicial branch decision-makers with artificial
intelligence is particularly problematic, so that is the focus here. The
choice to draw the line at Article III judges is admittedly somewhat
arbitrary, but this article argues that a line must be drawn somewhere, and
that Article III is a reasonable place to draw it. The human legal
community is in large part built around Article III judges, and it seems
likely that as long as there are human judges, there will remain a demand
for at least some human lawyers, as at least some human judges would
likely find human lawyers more persuasive.6 So at least some higher end
4. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1148.
5. Cf. Jason Chung & Amanda Zink, Hey Watson, Can I Sue You for Malpractice? Examining
the Liability of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 11 ASIA-PACIFIC J. HLTH L. & ETHICS 51 (2018).
6. Cf. Dana Remus and Frank Levy, Can Robots be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the
Practice of Law, ABA LAW PRACTICE DIVISION 59 (July 20, 2016) (“The rule of law necessitates respect
for and compliance with law from a variety of sources even absent active enforcement . . . and it requires
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litigants would likely remain willing to pay for human lawyers to argue
before the human judges, for example in difficult appellate cases that
could reasonably go either way. Thus maintaining human Article III
judges would at least maintain a portion of the human legal community
built around them, while still allowing for the use of some legal AI in
other ways.7
Part I briefly introduces the arguments that some contemporary legal
scholars make in favor of replacing (to at least some degree) law with AI
and offers some preliminary responses. Parts II and III then track the two
main points set forth above: the role of the human judiciary in legal
change and separation of powers, respectively. This Article concludes by
considering some of the potential benefits of AI judges, and some
alternative ways in which such benefits could be achieved.
I. THE ARGUMENTS FOR ARTIFICIAL LAW
In his recent essay, Chief Justice Robots, Eugene Volokh argues that if
AI technology reaches the point that it can “create persuasive opinions,
capable of regularly winning opinion-writing competitions against human
judges,” then “we should in principle accept it as a judge.”8 As Volokh
recognizes, this is a “thought experiment,” as AI technology is currently
far from this point.9 Nevertheless, such a thought experiment can provoke
important discussions about the proper role of humans versus artificial
intelligence in the legal field.
Professor Volokh’s argument that we should replace judges with AI is
contingent on them passing what he calls the “Modified John Henry
Test,” an opinion writing competition wherein “a computer program is
arrayed against, say, ten average performers” in the given field, and if “the
computer performs at least as well as the average performer,” then it
participation in the development and application of law, and its evolution over time. These are things that
lawyers uniquely ensure and support, but that computers cannot and do not.”). Frank Pasquale, A Rule of
Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 55 (2019) (“A robust
and ethical legal profession respects that discretion, founded on the flexibility and subtlety of legal
language, as a prerequisite for a just and accountable social order.”)
7. My argument here is that at the very least, Article III judges should remain human, but many
of the arguments here could also counsel against the use of say, AI law clerks. There are benefits to using
human law clerks in that they learn and become members of the human legal community, which is
important as discussed herein. Perhaps it should be left up to individual judges whether they want to
continue to use human law clerks versus AI. In any event, at least the judges should remain human.
8. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1135 (aside from creating persuasive opinions, a second condition is
that the software must “be adequately protected against hacking and similar attacks”).
9. Id. at 1137. This paper thus falls more into what has been called the “futurist” category of AI
literature. See Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA ST. L. REV. 1305, 1306
(2019) (“A key motivation in writing this article is to provide a realistic, demystified view of AI that is
rooted in the actual capabilities of the technology. This is meant to contrast with discussions about AI
and law that are decidedly futurist in nature.”).
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passes the test and is an “adequate substitute for humans.”10 Whether the
program passes the test is determined by “a panel of, say, ten human
judges who are known to be experts in the subject,” who must “evaluate
everyone’s performance without knowing which participant is a computer
and which is a human.”11 This panel of experts will be herein referred to
as the “evaluators,” as in Professor Volokh’s essay.
According to Professor Volokh, “prospective AI Supreme Court
Justices should be measured against the quality of average candidates for
the job – generally experienced, respected appellate judges.”12 Professor
Volokh’s criterion for evaluation is “persuasiveness,” that is, “if the
Henry Test evaluator panelists are persuaded by the argument for” the AI
judge’s chosen result. If (again, as a thought experiment) an AI judge can
consistently pass this test, Professor Volokh argues that we should adopt
it, because it is “likely to be much cheaper, quicker, and less subject to
certain forms of bias,” thus making the legal system “not only more
efficient but also fairer and more accessible to poor and middle-class
litigants.”13
Although Professor Volokh makes this argument most directly, his
view is not entirely an anomaly; some other legal scholarship has been
trending in a similar direction. For example, Professor Aziz Huq argues
that there is no right to a human decision, but instead merely “a right to a
well-calibrated machine decision.”14 In the same vein, Professors
Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett have predicted that like self-driving
cars, “laws, too, will be self-driving,”15 and that advances in AI and
communications technology will “be able to identify the rules applicable
to an actual situation and inform the regulated actor exactly how to
comply” such that “microdirectives will become the dominant form of
law[.]”16 They predict that “opportunities for statutory interpretation and
filling the gaps in vague standards will dry up as citizens are simply
instructed to obey simple directives.”17 Casey and Niblett recognize that
“citizens who simply follow rules and directives may become robotic,
mere automatons,” but nevertheless state that the “trend towards microdirectives will be real as the cost of prediction and communication

10. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1138-39.
11. Id. at 1139.
12. Id. at 1140.
13. Id.
14. Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 106 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2020).
15. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429, 442 (2016)
[hereinafter Self-Driving Laws].
16. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401,
1404 (2017).
17. Id. at 1435.
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falls.”18 When it comes to judges and the law though, the discussion is
about the public sector, so whether the legal system should move in this
direction is a normative question, one that Professors Casey and Niblett
explicitly decline to address.19
Just as the person using GPS navigation does not learn their way
around the roads,20 the more we turn law over to machines, the more we
as a society may forget how to think about law.21 In other words, if a
person uses GPS navigation, that person does not develop as much of an
internal sense of direction. Likewise, the greater the role machines play
in legal decision-making, the greater the risk that society collectively
loses its ability to determine, understand, question, criticize, and
potentially shape the law. Even if the AI judges are working initially,
there is no guarantee that something will not eventually go wrong. To the
contrary, as with all technology, something eventually will go wrong.22
Contemporary society does seem to have some tendency to adopt new
technologies before they are entirely ready.23 But if society has lost its
ability to “judge” the law, then it may have also lost its ability to adapt
when the inevitable problems arise.

18. Self-Driving Laws, supra note 15, at 438.
19. See Casey & Niblett, supra note 16, at 1405 (“Our analysis is positive rather than normative.”).
I have previously criticized this deterministic aspect of their work and so will not rehash the issue here.
See Andrew C. Michaels, Abstract Innovation, Virtual Ideas, and Artificial Legal Thought, 14 MAR. J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 25 (2019). Cf. Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially
Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242, 247 (2019) (“over time, increasing use of AI adjudication
will foster changes in values that are conducive to even greater use of AI adjudication, thereby creating a
self-reinforcing cycle”).
20. See, e.g., Joseph Stromberg, Is GPS ruining our ability to navigate for ourselves?, VOX (Sept.
2, 2015, 11:31 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/9/2/9242049/gps-maps-navigation (“we have good
reason to believe that when we blindly follow GPS for direction, we’re not exercising crucial navigational
skills – and many of the scientists who study how the human brain navigates are concerned.”).
21. Cf. Deborah Cassens Weiss, ‘Beware the Robots,’ Chief Justice Tells High School Graduates,
ABA
J.
(June
8,
2018
4:10
PM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/beware_the_robots_chief_justice_tells_high_school_graduates
/ [https://perma.cc/FBQ6-4PKT] (“‘My worry is not that machines will start thinking like us,’ Roberts
said. ‘I worry that we will start thinking like machines.’”).
22. For a fictional example, see Futurama, Fear of a Bot Planet (FOX television broadcast Apr.
20, 1999) (Computer Judge: “Thank you prosecutor, I will now consider the evidence.”. . . [Sorry A
System Error Occurred], Robot Clerk: “Uh oh! He froze up again!” Robot Mayor: “Try control alt
delete.”).
23. Cf. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where Robots
Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018); Clark D. Asay, Artificial Stupidity, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020)(manuscript at 4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399170 (“despite the incessant hype
about and ever growing uses of AI, many AI experts lament a lack of any real progress in the AI space”);
Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal Services, 2015 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1797, 1802 (2016) (“When a disruption occurs before all of the core functions of an industry have
been innovated, there is a risk that this Incomplete Innovation will force the un-innovated core functions
to become scarce or disappear.”).
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II. LEGAL CHANGE
Professor Volokh’s Modified John Henry test for adoption does not
adequately account for the role that the judiciary plays in shaping the law.
Professor Volokh does recognize that “[l]aw development – whether
common law development, constitutional law development, or
interpretive development about statues – often requires prediction: Would
a proposed legal rule do more good or harm?”24 But in his view, “we
humans don’t set the bar very high,” so “AIs don’t need to have perfect
clairvoyance or legal statesmanship” to beat us.25 According to Professor
Volokh, “success in the Henry Test will be the best measure of judicial
quality,” that is, “[i]f the evaluators are persuaded by the AI judge’s
prediction-based arguments more than by the human judges’ arguments,
why should we doubt the AI judge’s abilities more than we doubt the
human judges’ abilities?”26
Professor Volokh’s point that humans do not have perfect clairvoyance
is certainly true, but human judges do not need it because they are able to
update the law over time in response to changing and unforeseen societal
circumstances in the society of which they are a part. It is not clear that
an AI judiciary would be able to do the same thing, or at least, Professor
Volokh’s Modified John Henry test for adoption does not ensure that it
would. Professor Volokh’s test is based on persuasiveness to a panel of
evaluators at a particular point in time. But what is persuasive at one point
in time is not necessarily persuasive later on, as the factual realities and
moral values of society shift.27 Furthermore, no matter how many “test
cases” the evaluators look at, the test cases will never adequately
encompass the full range of possible fact situations that could and will
arise in the future.
Although written almost a century ago, Benjamin Cardozo’s The
Growth of Law has a good deal of relevance to Professor Volokh’s
thought experiment. Responding to some agitation for a more rigid
conception of stare decisis, then Judge (later Justice) Cardozo set forth a
persuasive explication and defense of the judicial role in legal
development.28 According to Judge Cardozo, legislation alone is not a
sufficient agency of legal growth, because “[u]nique situations can never
24. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1183.
25. Id. at 1184.
26. Id.
27. Cf. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970)
(“‘Improper’ will always be a word of many nuances, determined by time, place, and circumstances.”).
28. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 132-133 (1924) (“Stare decisis is not
in the constitution, but I should be half ready to put it there, and to add thereto the requirement of
mechanical and literal reproduction, if only it were true that legislation is a sufficient agency of growth.
The centuries, if they have proved anything, have proved the need of something more.”).
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have their answers ready made as in the complete letter-writing guides or
the manuals of the art of conversation.”29 That is, situations that the
legislature (or the prior precedent writing court) did not anticipate ex ante
will inevitably arise, and it is one job of the courts to gradually adjust the
law ex post on a case-by-case basis, while applying it to a particular
controversy.30 As Judge Friendly has also explained, it “is impossible for
the legislator to foresee everything,” and “a code, however complete it
may appear, is no sooner promulgated than a thousand unexpected
questions are presented to the judge.”31
This is part of why precedential holdings are not (and should not be)
rigidly set in stone, but rather can (and should) be gradually shaped by
subsequent decisions, in light of changing circumstances and new
information.32 Even lower courts sometimes “narrow ambiguous
precedents that have become outdated in light of new events or
technologies.”33 As Judge Cardozo put it: “adaption of rule or principle
to changing combinations of events demands the creative action of the
judge.”34 The fact that judges help shape the law supports the notion that
we are governing ourselves through rule of law, rather than being
commanded by some pure assertion of authority.35 The law is something
that human society creates, monitors, and updates, not an external
governing force. The primary purpose of legal argument through briefing
and oral presentation to a human judge is not just that it provides
therapeutic benefits to the litigant, it is rather that it provides the
opportunity to persuade the judge, and thus potentially shape the law, to
the extent that the opinion rendered is precedential. As such, it is not only
judges that currently shape the law, but also litigants, acting (usually)
through lawyers. But this ability to shape the law depends on the human
29. Id. at 133.
30. Id. (“Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by slow advances.”).
31. Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer – Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 220
(1961).
32. See Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, 70 ARK. L. REV. 661, 679 (2017)
(“generalizations will not always be perfect; the courts cannot be expected to foresee or fully consider all
potential fact situations falling within the generalizations that they necessarily make”); CARDOZO, supra
note 28, at 138 (“The rule as announced must be deemed tentative. For the many and varying facts to
which it will be applied cannot be foreseen.”); ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 161
(1983) (“since precedent is the style of Anglo-Saxon law, the courts define a new technology as a special
case of a familiar one.”).
33. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 925
(2016).
34. CARDOZO, supra note 28, at 135.
35. Cf. id. at 137-38 (“This power of creation, if it is to be exercised with vision and understanding,
exacts a philosophy of law, a theory of its genesis and growth and aim. Only thus shall we be saved from
the empiricism which finds in an opinion not a prophecy to inspire, but a command to be obeyed.”);
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 636-37 (1995) (“The act of giving a reason is
the antithesis of authority. When the voice of authority fails, the voice of reason emerges. Or vice versa.”).
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judge being potentially persuadable. Professor Volokh’s argument
focuses on the AI judge’s ability to write a persuasive opinion,36 but it
seems to overlook the importance of the ability of the judge to be
persuaded. Indeed, Professor Volokh’s conception of an AI judge seems
to render persuasive argument by litigants unnecessary.37 It might be
possible to construct a persuadable AI, but then we are left with difficult
questions regarding what factors the AI should be persuaded based on. In
any event, these questions are not addressed by a test that merely asks
whether the AI can issue persuasive opinions.
Professor Volokh recognizes the potentially controversial nature of his
focus on “persuasiveness” as the key evaluation metric.38 While
persuasiveness may be ideal for a lawyer, the task of a judge writing an
opinion is different. The judge must acknowledge the arguments on both
sides and explain why the judge is choosing one side over the other (or
choosing some middle ground) and then decide how broadly to write the
decision with an eye towards both its ex ante precedential effects and
consistency with prior precedent. Moreover, when the judge is faced with
a difficult decision, the value of candor counsels that the judge should
acknowledge the difficulty, even though this may hinder persuasiveness
(depending on one’s point of view).39 An open acknowledgement of a
“close case” may play a role in how the decision is interpreted in the future
as the law continues to develop; for example, the decision may be read
more narrowly as a result. A focus on persuasiveness does not necessarily
capture the quality of measured carefulness that that is arguably just as if
not more important in judges as they shape the law through precedential
decisions.
Persuasiveness is also inherently subjective; indeed it is difficult to
think of many things that are more quintessentially subjective. Deciding
whether one is persuaded by an argument, like judging, often requires a
choice between incommensurable values; it is not a matter of mere
numerical calculation.40 To the extent that lawyers and judges are all
36. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1140-41.
37. See id. at 1141 (“If we can create an AI brief-writer that can persuade, we can create an AI
judge that can (1) construct persuasive arguments that support the various possible results in the case, and
then (2) choose from all those arguments the one that is most persuasive, and thus the result that can be
most persuasively supported.”).
38. Id. (“And if the Henry Test evaluator panelists are persuaded by the argument for that result,
that means they have concluded the result is correct. This connection between AI brief-writing and AI
judging is likely the most controversial claim in the paper.”).
39. See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987)
(calling candor “the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power”); GUIDO CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 178-81 (1982) (advocating a “choice for candor” and
explaining that the “language of categoricals” is “particularly prone to manipulation”).
40. See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV.
1, 68 (2016) (“Inherent in the very idea of judging is the notion of judgment; courts are frequently
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trained to think in a certain way,41 or are an interpretive community,42
some of the subjectivity is mitigated, but still much of it remains, which
is why appellate judges often disagree and write dissents, despite
generally being well trained in law. Professor Volokh’s proposal would
seem to merely shift these subjective judgments from the judges
themselves (viewing the law in the context of a concrete dispute ex post),
to the panel of Henry test “evaluators” (evaluating the predicted
performance of the AI judges ex ante based on test cases).
To be sure, the ability of the judiciary to make law is moderated and
constrained, it is not as drastic and sudden as ex ante legislation, which is
reserved for the legislative branch.43 As Judge Cardozo observes: “Law
must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still.”44 This careful balance
between stability and change is illustrated in the doctrine of retroactivity,
which holds that a legal decision changing the law (e.g., overruling or
narrowing a precedent) generally must be applied retroactively to other
events taking place before the decision was rendered.45 The doctrine of
retroactivity serves as an important check on judicial law creation. If
courts are forced to apply changes in the law retroactively and forced to
confront the potential unfairness in that, they may decide to adhere to
stare decisis and the prior rule rather than risk the unfairness of retroactive
application, even if they would have ruled differently had they been
writing on a clean slate.46 As such, the doctrine of retroactivity
delegated regulatory and adjudicative tasks that must choose between valid and important social values.”);
Joshua P. Davis, Law Without Mind: AI, Ethics, and Jurisprudence 1 (Univ. of S.F. Law Research Paper
No. 2018-05, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3187513 (arguing that the
“ultimate bulwark against ceding legal interpretation to computers – from having computers usurp the
responsibility and authority of attorneys, citizens, and even judges – may be to recognize the role of moral
judgment in saying what the law is.”).
41. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER (2009).
42. See Stanley Fish, Is There A Text in This Class, HARVARD U. PRESS (1980), 147-174.
43. A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act, 66 UCLA L. REV.
654, 676 (2019) (“The governmental act of prospectively conferring and defining the bundle of obligations
and privileges that yield the entitlements described above is a legislative function (at least at the federal
level) because such rights reflect basic policy decisions that shape our society.”) (citing Am. Trucking
Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[P]rospective decisionmaking is
incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be.”).
44. CARDOZO, supra note 28, at 143. See also Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative
Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 275-76 (1961)
(“judicial creation is an inevitable and vital part of our law . . . the process in its highest reaches is not
discovery but creation”).
45. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (“When this Court applies a rule of
federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be
given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.”).
46. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 278-79 (1972) (“All this, combined with the flood of
litigation that would follow its repudication, the harassment that would ensue, and the retroactive effect
of such a decision, led the Court to the practical result that it should sustain the unequivocal line of
authority reaching over many years.”).
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encourages courts to make only minor and gradual shifts in the law,47
leaving more drastic prospective changes for the legislative branch.48 In
this sense, it could be said that the retroactivity requirement gives teeth to
stare decisis.49 The doctrine of retroactivity thus has roots in the
separation of powers and ensures that although the judiciary plays a role
in legal development, it is a softer and more measured role than the
legislature.50 Professor Volokh’s Modified John Henry test for adoption
of AI judges does not ensure that they would be able to adequately fulfill
this dynamic role in the long term.
The teachings of legal realism help to further highlight the fact that
courts in many cases make policy choices in developing the law, working
against the notion that law can be reduced to computing.51 To be sure,
the result in most cases is dictated by existing law, but a significant
fraction of cases could go either way, and when faced with such forks in
the road, judges must make a choice about in which direction the law will
proceed.52 Judge Cardozo also recognized “that every doubtful decision
involves a choice between a nicely balanced alternative, and no matter
how long we debate or how carefully we ponder, we shall never arrive at
certitude.”53 These days, it is fairly uncontroversial to say that judges at
47. Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 70 (1965) (“Ineluctable
retroactivity would seem to operate as an ‘inherent restraint’ on judicial lawmaking because it compels
the Court to confront in sharpest form possible undesirable consequences of adopting a new rule, as for
example, when it appears that application of the newly framed doctrine may result in imposing liability
or other burden on someone who acted in justified reliance on the old law.”).
48. Id. at 65-66 (“Prospective lawmaking is generally equated with legislation. Indeed, the
conscious confrontation of the question of an effective date – even if only in the form of providing explicit
affirmative justification for retroactive operation – smacks of the legislative process; for it is ordinarily
taken for granted (particularly under the Blackstonian symbolic conception) that judicial decisions operate
with inevitable retroactive effect.”).
49. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Prospective
decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis.”).
50. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(explaining that difficulties posed by retroactivity “are one of the understood checks upon judicial
lawmaking; to eliminate them is to render courts substantially more free to ‘make new law,’ and thus to
alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three branches”).
51. See Mishkin, supra note 47, at 68 (“The insights of ‘legal realism,’ developing and spreading
at a perhaps accelerating rate since at least the twenties, provided a necessary corrective to an overly
rigidified conception of the Court as totally without choice or will, merely carrying out the supposedly
preordained dictates of the Constitution.”).
52. See id. at 60 (explaining that “it is certainly true that courts in general handle the vast bulk of
cases by application of preexisting law,” and that “informed estimates put the figure at close to 90%”)
(citing Friendly, 71 YALE L.J. at 222).
53. CARDOZO, supra note 28, at 140. I am speaking here of classical legal realism, rather than
what some have called “new legal realism.” See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal
Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 831 (2008) (“We are in the midst of a flowering of ‘large-scale
quantitative studies of facts and outcome,’ with numerous published results. The relevant studies have
produced a New Legal Realism – an effort to understand the sources of judicial decisions on the basis of
testable hypotheses and large data sets.”).
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least sometimes do more than simply “call balls and strikes.”54 Indeed,
the entire Chevron doctrine is based on the idea that for some questions
of statutory interpretation, there is a range of reasonable answers to which
courts must defer.55 As such, “Chevron has been seen as a triumph of
legal realism.”56
There likewise is often room for reasonable disagreement in the
interpretation of precedent. No single accepted test exists for determining
exactly what is holding and what is dicta, and in many cases there is no
easy way to decide.57 There will always be some possible distinction from
a precedent case, so whether a judge chooses to follow a case turns on
whether the proffered distinction is a meaningful one, or whether it is
merely a distinction without a difference, an inherently subjective
inquiry.58 The prominent legal realist Karl Lewellyn has gone so far as to
say that the doctrine of precedent is “two-headed” or “Janus-faced” in that
there “is one doctrine for getting rid of precedents deemed troublesome
and one doctrine for making use of precedents that seem helpful.”59
Professor Volokh acknowledges the legal realism objection to
automated law, but his response is that it is dealt with by his focus on
persuasion in the Modified John Henry test, which focuses on “which
candidate most often persuades the evaluators,” “without any need to
decide what the supposedly correct answer is.”60 But when choosing
between multiple possible acceptable answers, the judge is charting a path
for the law, to the extent that the opinion is precedential. This path should
be at least potentially influenced by the arguments presented to the judge
that have been developed in the legal community in light of modern
54. See William Blake, Umpires as Legal Realists, 45 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 271, 271 (2012)
(“During his confirmation, then-judge John Roberts anologized the role of a judge to the role of a baseball
umpire. . . . Legal scholars have criticized Roberts from a legal realist perspective because the analogy
misconstrues the nature of judging as formalistic.”).
55. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
229 (2001) (explaining that when Chevron applies, a reviewing court “is obliged to accept the agency’s
position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable.”).
56. Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis,
and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 836
(2010).
57. See generally Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, 70 ARK. L. REV. 661
(2017) [hereinafter The Holding-Dictum Spectrum]. The same could be said for determining whether a
case has been “implicitly overruled.” See generally Andrew C. Michaels, Implicit Overruling and Foreign
Lost Profits, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 101 (2019).
58. See The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, supra note 57, at 685; Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining
the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 165 (1930).
59. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 69-70 (1930).
60. Volokh, 68 DUKE L. J. at 1141.
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circumstances and the facts of the case at hand. Thus the crux of the legal
realism objection to legal automation lies in the question it poses as to
how the law chooses between alternative acceptable answers.
Disagreements amongst judges as explicated in circuit splits and
dissents have the beneficial epistemic effect of bringing these various
plausible legal choices out into the open where they can potentially be
understood and debated. In an AI judiciary, this debate could be relegated
to taking place within a black box. Thus the potential uniformity of an
AI judiciary may be overvalued.61 Replacing the human judiciary with
an automated one that instantaneously generates an answer would erase
the period of suspended conclusion during which societal legal thought
takes place.62 The value of the legal process itself, and the practical
advantages of the process being conducted by humans themselves, are
discussed further in the next Part.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The role of the judiciary is not merely to develop and apply the law,
but also to provide a check on the other two branches. This task can be
difficult, for it has been observed that the judiciary is the “least
dangerous” branch in that it has “no influence over either the sword or the
purse,” it has “neither force nor will, but merely judgment.”63
Judgment alone can wield the power to serve as a check only to the
extent that it diffuses broadly throughout the judiciary and to a lesser
extent even beyond the judiciary.64 If almost no one understands the law,
it is hard to imagine any type of a substantial public response to
lawlessness in, say, the executive branch. Professor Volokh’s condition
for adoption of AI judges, demonstration that the AI judges can write
persuasive opinions, does not seem to provide any assurance that the AI
61. Cf. Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1574 (2008) (“If the lower
courts reach varied but reasonable conclusions about the meaning of a federal statute, and the difference
do not create significant disruption or inequality, then the Court should decline to resolve the conflict.”).
CARLOS NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 113 (1996) (“Intersubjective
discussion and decision is the most reliable procedure for having access to moral truth, since the exchange
of ideas and the need to justify oneself before others not only broaden one’s knowledge and reveal defects
in reasoning but also help satisfy the requirement of impartial attention to the interests of everybody
concerned.”).
62. Cf. Donald J. Kochan, Thinking Like Thinkers: Is the Art and Discipline of an ‘Attitude of
Suspended Conclusion’ Lost on Lawyers?, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 64 (2011) (“lawyers must be
reminded that seldom is an outcome clear in a legal dispute, and as such, there is almost always a rival
proposition to ponder.”).
63. A Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 78 (1788).
64. Cf. BANJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 (1921) (“[T]he
judgment of the lawyer class, will spread to others, and tinge the common consciousness and the common
faith.”).
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judiciary could fulfill its role as a check. A machine’s ability to write a
persuasive opinion does nothing to indicate that it can serve as an
independent check on the other two branches. Given that the other two
branches would presumably maintain their lawmaking abilities, they
would seem to have a large degree of control over an AI judiciary. It may
be possible to construct some AI system that provides more of a check,
but it would not be trivial to do so, and those arguing for legal automation
do not attempt to address this problem.
In our current system, we have many judges applying the law, and
although they occasionally disagree, usually they apply the law in more
or less the same way, at least ideally; the law is not supposed to depend
on the judge. This is a redundancy, but one that can be beneficial,65 in
that it fosters a community of people with incentives to pay attention to
the law.66 It stands to reason that when people are paying attention and
notice legal changes or inadequacies, they are able to raise awareness and
potential public outcry.
But if no one is paying attention, then no one notices when the law
changes, and it stands to reason that those with the power to change the
law are less constrained by public sentiment. Imagine a world in which
all Article III judges were replaced by AI. Unless that AI judges were
specifically programmed to prefer human lawyers, it seems likely that the
number of human lawyers would be greatly diminished in such a world.
Indeed, in Professor Volokh’s argument, robot lawyers come before robot
judges.67 And if we didn’t have human judges or lawyers, we probably
wouldn’t have human law professors or law students either, or at least we
wouldn’t have nearly as many.68
Professor Volokh does recognize the possibility that “there could be a
procedure for discretionary review of the AI Supreme Court’s decision by
an all-human Highest Constitutional Council;”69 so, to be fair, his
proposal would perhaps not entirely eviscerate this legal community, but
it would drastically weaken it. In Professor Volokh’s view, members of
this council “might well be chosen not for legal acumen but for their

65. See John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 629 (2016)
(“The pervasiveness of legal redundancy has at least one straightforward explanation. Redundancy has
much to offer.”).
66. See Anthony D’Amato, Can/Should Computers Replace Judges, 11 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1299
(1977) (“A second cost will be to render areas of law uninteresting. . . . At present, many people are
immediately interested, whether financially or from a teaching or research point of view, in conflicts of
laws.”).
67. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1148-51.
68. Cf. Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note 19, at 247 (“Increasing use of AI will also foster lay
and even professional alienation from law as adjudication increasingly moves within the exclusive
dominion of technical specialists.”).
69. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1190.
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perceived moral qualities,” and would come in to play in “only a small
portion of all cases decided by appellate judges, or even by Supreme
Court Justices.”70
AI law might be more efficient, but we would have in large part lost
the community of people whose job it is to pay attention to the law, which
could become a problem when the law changes.71 The legal community
is at least paying attention and that would seem provide some degree of a
check on those with the power to change the law, at least as compared
with a world where people are not paying attention. The loss of
redundancy in switching from human judges to AI thus creates some risk
that may not be worth the potential efficiency gains
Aside from merely monitoring the law, the legal community also plays
a role in shaping the law, spreading power and supporting the notion that
we, as a society, govern ourselves. The potential to shape the law is in
part what provides members of the legal community with incentives to
pay attention to the law. There would be little incentive to construct a
quality legal argument if there were no possibility that doing so could
shape the result, (and thereby potentially shape the law through
precedent). Judges are responsive to lawyers, who are responsive to
clients, such that power to potentially shape the law is spread throughout
the legal community and society. This helps promote the sense that we
as a society have some control over the laws that govern us; that we are
governing ourselves rather than submitting to (or simply obeying) an
outside authority.72
Those in the legal community have all been trained to think similarly,
that is, like lawyers.73 When we say that the result in ninety percent of
cases is determined by law whereas maybe ten percent could go either
way, what we mean is that for those ninety percent, no reasonable judge
or lawyer would decide the other way, but this only works to the extent
that most lawyers think in a similar way. A judge writing an opinion is
in part explaining their reasoning so that the legal community and society
can better understand the decision and thus the law. A legal opinion is
70. Id.
71. Cf. FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 72
(2017) (“The problem is that when we outsource thinking to machines, we are really outsourcing thinking
to the organizations that run the machines.”).
72. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“ours is a government of laws, not of men, and . . . we submit ourselves to rulers only if
under rules.”).
73. Cf. Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening
(A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803, 828 (2009) (“When one thinks of what lawyers must
strive to do – which is mainly resolve difficult disputes and control the future though documentary writings
– certain things emerge as crucial to their work. One is that they speak and think in a common language.
. . . To the extent that ‘all lawyers think alike,’ they can with some certainty predict what other lawyers
will do – both in litigation and in transactional contexts. This is arguably socially useful.”).
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thus in part a discourse between society and the legal system, and the fact
that the judge is also a member of society and the legal community would
seem beneficial to this discourse.
This discourse can deter abuses of authority, for even “simply
anticipating the need to give reasons and enhance deliberative rigor,”
“reason-giving coveys respect for one’s audience,” and when “citizens
can evaluate and critique public officials’ reasons, they are better poised
to ensure that the government acts in their best interests.”74 But if the
legal community has no legitimate opportunity to question the AI judge’s
reasons through argument or on appeal and attempt to persuade, the value
of reason giving is diminished.75 To the extent that an AI judge is a black
box, its true reasons are unknown (secret) or even unknowable, and to the
extent that the AI judiciary is not persuadable such that there is no
meaningful opportunity to challenge its reasons, the giving of reasons is
largely “a hollow exercise.”76
It is also worth considering whether an AI judiciary could comply with
Article III’s case or controversy requirement.77 This requirement “is not
just an empty formality;” rather, it “preserves the vitality of the
adversarial process,” such that the legal questions presented “will be
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a
concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action.”78 Courts exercise an important
lawmaking and policymaking function when they interpret the law so as
to resolve legal questions, and it is beneficial for such interpretation to
take place in the context of concrete factual disputes.
When exactly is the AI judge making its decision? Has it in some sense
already made its decision before the case? One could perhaps argue that
the decision is made when the machine is programmed, in which case, the
decision would not be made in the context of an actual case or controversy
as required by Article III. In other words, the human decision-making
point is in the choice of the AI judge, rather than in deciding the concrete
case as in our current system. To be sure, there is currently human
decision-making involved in our choice of human judges, but we
74. Ashley S. Deeks, Secret Reason-Giving, 129 YALE L. J. 612, 627-28 (2020); see also John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 580 (1971) (“[J]ustification is argument addressed to those who disagree with
us, or to ourselves when we are of two minds.”).
75. See Deeks, Secret Reason-Giving, 129 YALE L. J. at 675-76 (explaining that secret reason
giving “imposes only a weak form of constraint” particularly “when the reason-giver merely goes through
the motions of developing a reason,” or “when those receiving the reasons feel as though they have little
latitude to push back, critique, or otherwise signal dissatisfaction”).
76. Id. at 676.
77. See U.S. CONST. Art. III §§ 1-2.
78. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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generally do not know exactly how the human judges we choose will
decide cases in the future, and sometimes their views shift over time. The
computer code programming an AI judge could be seen as an incredibly
detailed statute or “code”,79 one that pre-answers all possible questions,
albeit in a black box way.80
To the extent that there is private intellectual property covering the
code behind AI judges, the problems are compounded.81 If and to the
extent that we do start to turn the law into code, at the very least the code
must be public and not owned as intellectual property. If the code is
public, then lawyers together with computer scientists (or lawyers trained
in computer science) could at least examine the code and thus the law,
though it would not necessarily be easy to construct a system where
computer scientist lawyers would have an adequate incentive and ability
to do so. Just as judges do not own the opinions they write, the artificial
judges themselves, or the code behind them, must not be owned; since the
law is binding on citizens, it must remain free for all to examine and
attempt to understand.82 The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that
“no one can own the law,” given that every “citizen is presumed to know

79. Cf. Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1043 (“A ‘code,’
let us say, is a legislative enactment which entirely pre-empts the field and which is assumed to carry
within it the answers to all possible questions: thus when a court comes to a gap or an unforeseen situation,
its duty is to find, by extrapolation and analogy, a solution consistent with the policy of the codifying
law.”).
80. See Asay, supra note 23, at 29 (“because of the lack of transparency surrounding AI systems
in a number of important industries, some scholars have complained that such AI systems are a ‘black
box’”) (citing FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015)); Re & Solow-Niederman, supra note
19, at 262 (“Perhaps the most widely appreciated risk of AI decision-making is that it could function in
ways that are hard or impossible for humans to comprehend.”); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The
Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018); Cade Metz, Mark
Zuckerberg, Elon Musk and the Feud Over Killer Robots, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/technology/elon-musk-mark-zuckerberg-artificialintelligence.html [perma.cc/B26Z-CMAV] (quoting Mark Zuckerberg testifying before Congress: “Right
now, a lot of our A.I. systems make decisions in ways that people don’t really understand.”); Harry Surden
& Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 121, 127 (2016) (“A system is ‘technologically opaque’ if it is difficult for an ordinary person to
understand what is going on inside that system.”).
81. Cf. Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L.
REV. 54, 141 (2019) (“The future of civil rights in an age of AI requires us to explore the limitations
within intellectual property and, more specifically, trade secrets.”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 213 (1979) (“It is one of the important principles of the [rule of
law] doctrine that the making of particular laws should be guided by open and relatively stable general
rules.”).
82. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888) (“Judges, as is well understood, receive
from the public treasury a stated annual salary, fixed by law, and can themselves have no pecuniary
interest or proprietorship as against the public at large, in the fruits of their judicial labor. . . . The question
is one of public policy, and there has always been a judicial consensus . . . that no copyright could under
the statutes passed by Congress, be secured in the products of the labor done by judicial officers in the
discharge of their judicial duties.”).
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the law,” so “all should have free access to its contents.”83 The same
should be true of AI judges, particularly if they are not persuadable by
humans. Although one cannot look inside the mind of a human judge, a
lawyer does in our present system usually have the opportunity to attempt
to address the judge’s concerns.
In any event, the primary concern surrounding Article III is that an AI
judiciary could not sufficiently check the other two branches. Although
separation of powers is not explicitly in the Constitution, it is considered
to be implicit in a number of provisions, including the clauses that vest
each of the three branches with certain responsibilities.84 The Supreme
Court has discussed the importance of the “constitutionally mandated
balance of power” to checking “abuses of government power” by
preventing “the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch,” so
as to “reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse.”85
The separation of powers concerns discussed above make AI decisionmaking particularly problematic in the judicial branch. Although some
machine decision-making is already being done in the executive branch
or the administrative agencies,86 this does not seem as problematic. One
way of thinking about the executive branch is that it is entirely or mostly
accountable through the President anyway,87 so if the President chooses
to delegate to AI rather than humans, that is seemingly their prerogative,
and in any event, it doesn’t raise separation of powers concerns.
Moreover, given that administrative agencies do not make law through
precedent in the way that courts do, many of the other arguments above
would not apply as strongly to the agencies.
83. Georgia v. Public Resource.org, Inc., No. 18-1150, 590 U.S. __ , slip op. at *7-8 (2020).
84. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar, Patent Court Specialization, 104 IOWA L. REV. 101, 118 (2019) (“The
term ‘separation of powers’ does not appear in the Constitution, but is instead inferred from the dividing
of legislative, executive, and judicial power into separate Articles.”) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 124 (1976); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 439-40 (1998)).
85. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991) (also discussing the importance of
federalism and how the dividing of power between the Federal Government and the States similarly
prevents abuse by providing “double security”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 323 (James Madison)
(“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two
distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.”)).
86. See Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1280
(2018) (“Given its utility, it is not surprising that government decision-makers seek to harness machine
learning’s predictive power for public-sector use. These tools already have made significant inroads in
the contexts of national security and law enforcement.”).
87. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1923) (“The ordinary duties of officers
prescribed by statute come under the general administrative control of the President by virtue of the
general grant to him of executive power, and he may properly supervise and guide their construction of
the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which
Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President
alone.”).
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CONCLUSION
Replacing judges with AI would entail drastic changes to law as we
know it and it is not at all clear that the changes would be for the better.
Nevertheless, proponents of AI law suggest three primary benefits:
efficiency, consistency, and access to justice.
Regarding efficiency,88 the judiciary is comparatively not that
expensive,89 and it seems like money well spent in preserving the voice
of humans in the law that governs them. An automated judiciary might
be faster, but the legal disagreements that arise from circuit splits and
dissents may actually be beneficial for society in that they engage the
legal community in protracted discussions about various sides of
important legal issues.90 In any event, efficiency arguments do not
adequately account for the increased risks due to the loss of redundancy,
nor do they answer the related separation of powers concerns.91 Indeed,
efficiency is not always paramount in rule of law, for the “doctrine of
separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”92 And
by for example adopting AI research tools or an AI staff attorney, some
efficiency benefits could be achieved without going so far as to automate
the Article III judges themselves.
Second, proponents argue that an AI judiciary would be less biased and

88. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1139 n.10 (“In some contexts, of course, automation may be better
even if it’s not as effective – for instance, it may be cheaper and thus more cost-effective. But if it’s
cheaper and at least as effective, then it would be pretty clearly superior.”); Huq, supra note 14, at *37
(“Right now, the demand for human review in the teeth of its likely costs and available alternative
responses, might seem little more than an aesthetic preference about the manner in which one interacts
with state actors. I am not sure that is enough to get a right to human decision off the ground.”); Casey &
Niblett, supra note 16 at 1403 (“A new form of law, the microdirective, will emerge to provide all of the
benefits of both rules and standards without the costs of either. These microdirectives will provide ex
ante behavioral prescriptions finely tailored to every possible scenario.”).
89. Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2019
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUMMARY 5 (2018) (“The judiciary’s appropriation request for fiscal year 2019
totals [$7.863 Billion]”); with OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. (COMPTROLLER), NATIONAL
DEFENSE BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR FY 2020 at 1 (2019) (showing $685 Billion DOD Discretionary
Budget Authority for 2019); and JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE “TAX
CUT AND JOBS ACT” AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE ON NOVEMBER
16, 2017 at 7 (2017) (estimating a net loss of over $1 trillion over fiscal years 2018-2027).
90. See JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 12 (1933) (explaining that reflective thinking “involves (1)
a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of
searching, hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the
perplexity.”).
91. See supra Part IV; cf. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1380 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“A judicial hearing before a property interest is stripped away
. . . can slow things down. But economy supplies no license for ignoring these – often vitally inefficient
– protections.”).
92. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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therefore more consistent.93 An initial response is that there could also be
bias built into the AI, as has been well documented in the literature.94
There is not much reason to think that the biases of the AI judges would
be any different or less than whatever the biases of the Modified John
Henry test panel of evaluators. But even assuming that the AI judges
would be better than humans on this score, that would still not do anything
to address all of the concerns above. The better way to deal with bias
would be for human judges to work on becoming more aware of it and
compensating for it, or better yet, to diversify the judiciary, as these would
be more well-tailored solutions to the problem of judicial bias. Another
more well-tailored way to deal with judicial bias might be to reduce
judicial discretion in situations (such as perhaps criminal sentencing)
where the effects of bias tend to be particularly acute.95 Bias in the
judiciary is a problem, but automating the judiciary is an overbroad and
inappropriate solution to that particular problem.
The third potential benefit offered is that the lower cost of legal services
will improve access to justice.96 The distinction between the public and
private sectors matters here. In the private sector, if a new technology
such as artificial intelligence is able to outcompete the incumbent human
lawyers by performing adequately at a lower cost, this article presents no
quarrel with allowing the market to choose such lower cost alternatives.
To the extent that this happens, it could lower the cost of legal services,
such that we could receive some of the access to justice benefits without
going so far as to replace Article III judges. An AI arbitration system, so
long is it is voluntarily agreed to, might be another way to possibly
93. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1140 (“And because such a program is also likely to be much
cheaper, quicker, and less subject to certain forms of bias, it promises to make the legal system not only
more efficient but also fairer and more accessible to poor and middle-class litigants.”); Huq, supra note
14, at *6 (“machine decisions are often capable of classification with a smaller number of false positives
and false negatives than humans, and have the potential to act with fewer distorting biases”); Casey &
Niblett, 92 IND. L. J. at 1410 (“And the laws will be highly calibrated to policy objectives with no chance
of judges introducing bias or incompetence.”); see also Benjamin Alarie et al., Regulation by Machine 4
(Dec. 6, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2878950 (“In a world where taxpayers
receive instantaneous rulings from regulators, the algorithm is the law. This new form of law is
characterized by greater consistency than regulators and courts could previously offer. The biases of
regulators, adjudicators, and judges are washed away, further reducing legal uncertainty.”).
94. See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit
Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579 (2018).
95. Cf. Berman, supra note 86, at 1283 (arguing that “government actors should exploit the
benefits of machine learning when they enjoy broad discretion in making decisions, while eschewing the
tool for decision-making when government discretion is highly constrained”); Re & Solow-Niederman,
supra note 19, at 243-44 (“Already, human judges increasingly rely on algorithmic analysis when making
bail and parole determinations that affect the freedom of many thousands of people every year.”).
96. See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1147 (“Realistically, the only way we are likely to sharply
increase access to expensive services, such as lawyering, is through technology.”); cf. Alaire et. al., supra
note 93, at *1 (“machine learning can predict how courts would decide legal disputes more cheaply and
accurately than human regulators”).
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capture some access to justice benefits while maintaining a human Article
III judiciary.
In short, the arguments for AI judges underappreciate and undervalue
the human aspects of law. If there are advantages to AI judges, the
advantages are limited and may well be outweighed by the substantial
disadvantages, which include a questionable ability to dynamically adapt
over time to changing circumstances, and possible detrimental effects
regarding separation of powers. At the least, these potential drawbacks
of an AI judiciary are worth taking seriously, and should be considered
and addressed before any plan to move in the direction of judicial
automation is put in motion.
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